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A B S T R A C T
Since signing the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the European Union (EU) has been working on increasing its
renewable energy supply. However, the progress has been uneven across member states. A vibrant literature
advances several explanations for this variation, but pays insufficient attention to a critical structural factor –
varying levels of natural resource wealth across the EU – and provides an incomplete account by focusing on
consumption indicators. Reconciling divergent views in the literature in a single framework, we hold that while
overall natural resource abundance can be conducive to renewable energy production within a country, specific
natural resources, such as petroleum, are likely to be harmful. These hypotheses find empirical support in a
mixed-methods study that combines a fixed-effects statistical analysis of comprehensive panel data between
1997 and 2015 with a comparative qualitative case study of the Netherlands and Belgium. The findings suggest
that to achieve the ambitious goals on renewable energy deployment, the EU needs additional policies that
explicitly tackle pernicious effects of specific natural resources, including rent-capturing by politicians, rent-
seeking by corporate vested interests, and lack of economic incentives to diversify.
1. Introduction
Since signing the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the European Union
(EU) has been working on increasing its renewable energy supply. A
decade later the Renewables Directive set the goal of increasing the
share of renewable energy in final energy consumption across the EU to
20 per cent by 2020 (European Commission, 2016). While the de-
ployment of renewables in the EU has grown, the progress has been
uneven across member states (Bürgin, 2015). A vibrant literature has
advanced a number of explanations for this variation (for useful sum-
maries, see Bürgin, 2015; Cadoret and Padovano, 2016; Strunz et al.,
2015).
One critical factor that has been dealt with only indirectly is natural
resource wealth. This creates a major gap in the literature. First, natural
resource wealth varies considerably across the EU (see BP, 2017) but its
direct impact on renewable energy is overlooked because existing work
at best uses indirect proxy measures, such as energy dependence.
Second, some factors that are believed to affect renewable energy de-
ployment can themselves depend on natural resource wealth because
the latter is often an exogenous, structural variable that has been shown
to lead to economic underperformance and poor institutional quality
(Bulte et al., 2005; Dunning, 2005; Ross, 1999). Therefore, omitting a
direct measure of resource abundance from the analysis risks
misattributing its effect to factors that transmit its impact. Tackling
these secondary factors may be akin to addressing symptoms rather
than underlying causes. Finally, discussions on the potential impact of
natural resources on renewable energy deployment offer two con-
flicting arguments, but a framework that can reconcile these views
while doing justice to both has not been proposed.
Building on the existing literature, we argue that while, on the one
hand, overall natural resource wealth can be conducive to renewable
energy production by providing required capital, on the other hand,
specific natural resources, such as petroleum, are likely to be harmful
due to their potentially corrosive effect on the economy and govern-
ance. Consequently, this paper pursues several objectives. The first is to
offer a systematic empirical investigation of the effect of natural re-
source wealth on renewable energy across the EU since the 1997
Amsterdam Treaty till 2015. The second is to explore the processes
through which this association is likely to be transmitted. Our over-
arching objective is to help advance European energy policy debates by
casting light on what impact policies, governance, and other time-
variant factors have on renewable energy production once the effects of
all important variables, including natural resources, are duly accounted
for in a unified framework. To these ends, we employ a mixed-methods
research design that combines a fixed-effects panel data statistical
analysis with a comparative qualitative case study of the Netherlands
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Our focus is on domestic renewable energy production per capita.
This differs from the focus on consumption used in the existing litera-
ture that follows the EU's preferred measure: ‘share of renewable energy
in gross final energy consumption’. Our choice of the outcome variable
is motivated by three related reasons. First, it is more appropriate for
this study's purposes because the logic of our argument is that the
production of one type of commodity creates obstacles to the produc-
tion of another. Second, while we recognize that the costs and benefits
of producing renewable energy can vary across countries, we take the
production of renewables as a stronger and more direct indicator of a
country’ commitment to the renewable energy transition. Theoretically
a country can continue producing substantial amounts of non-renew-
able energy for export while consuming more renewable energy at
home. A production measure can better indicate whether the country is
undertaking or shunning costly reforms and investments required by
renewable energy transition. Finally, measuring renewable energy as a
share of consumption can also bias results according to the amount of
total energy consumed, thus making the renewable energy commitment
seem smaller in countries that consume substantial amounts of energy,
and bigger in countries that consume less energy. Measuring renewable
energy as the primary production and on a per capita basis – here an
unbiased denominator – tackles these problems.
In terms of our explanatory factors we focus on time-variant
country-level variables that potentially affect renewable energy pro-
duction. The importance of looking at domestic factors is underscored
by the EU's heavy reliance on the motivations of its member states to
take steps towards renewable energy deployment (Bürgin, 2015;
Collier, 1996).
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. To our
knowledge, this is the first systematic empirical investigation of the
impact of natural resource wealth and petroleum rents on renewable
energy production in the EU. Second, unlike much of the existing re-
search on this topic, we supplement our large-N study with a com-
parative case study that offers a disciplined qualitative inquiry into the
processes which purportedly link renewables to natural resource
wealth. Third, we contribute to energy policy debates by reassessing the
role of policies, governance, and other previously hypothesized factors
once the role of natural resources and other factors is duly accounted
for. Such policies concern natural resources as well, because, while such
wealth is often a structural variable, in the context of democratic
countries the distortions engendered by it are amenable to policy
(Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006). Finally, by encompassing
the 1997–2015 period and thus offering the most extensive timeframe
possible, given our variables, and addressing the call to extend this
frame to include more recent years (Marques et al., 2010), we provide
the most up-to-date analysis.
The following section briefly reviews the literature. Next, we offer a
theoretical framework that guides our study. Subsequently, we outline
our research design. We then present the results of the quantitative and
qualitative analyses. We conclude with a summary of findings, a note
on limitations, and suggestions for future research.
2. Taking stock: domestic factors in renewable energy deployment
Existing research has advanced five major explanations of the var-
iation in domestic renewable energy production in Europe and else-
where. First, economic performance is an important factor for the
success of renewable energy projects. A primary problem to the pro-
duction of renewable energy seems to be its direct economic costs,
which in turn depend on economic development (Cadoret and
Padovano, 2016; Eyraud et al., 2011; Strunz et al., 2015). Renewable
energy technologies are capital-intensive and thus need large invest-
ment, particularly in the early stages of their development (Eyraud
et al., 2011: 4). Such costs are far higher in developing countries
compared to the developed world (Labordena et al., 2017). In
developing countries, labour is often poorly-trained, and the investment
climate is much more insecure, which makes the economy of renewable
energy production uncertain (Labordena et al., 2017, 54). Similarly,
economic growth is found to lead to an increase in renewable energy
production (Cadoret and Padovano, 2016).
Second, government's fiscal policies, such as environmental taxes or
feed-in tariffs, alter market forces and can thus determine whether the
investment in renewables is worthwhile or not (White et al., 2013;
Eyraud et al., 2011). Some scholars have argued that an absence of
government financial support is a key obstacle to the production of
renewables (Strunz et al., 2015; Pohl et al., 2010).
Third, political ideology can also play a significant role. Cadoret and
Padovano (2016) find that left-wing governments in Europe are more
likely to increase the share of renewable energy than right-wing gov-
ernments. They maintain that this is due to left-wing parties being less
concerned with the market compared to right-wing parties, and thus
less conscious about the economic costs these environmental policies
may have on the economy (Cadoret and Padovano (2016), 10).
Fourth, recent literature also increasingly sees the success, or lack
thereof, of renewable energy projects as the consequence of the inter-
play between lobbying by vested interests and electoral considerations
of politicians (Cadoret and Padovano, 2016; Kirchgässner and
Schneider, 2003; Marques et al., 2010; Strunz et al., 2015). From this
standpoint, the quality of government can play a significant role be-
cause the effectiveness of its bureaucracy, its degree of independence
from political pressures, and its regulatory quality are indicators of the
strength to which a government can resist the influences of external
interests (Cadoret and Padovano, 2016).
Finally, environmental pressures are obvious factors that need to be
taken into account. Specifically, high energy dependence and higher
environmental degradation can provide strong incentives for renewable
energy deployment (Marques et al., 2010).
3. Hypotheses: what role can natural resource wealth play?
Hartwick (1977) argues that natural resource wealth should have a
positive effect on renewable energy production because it increases the
capital available for investment. This idea echoes the argument that
resource rents can be productively invested towards sustainable de-
velopment of the producing country (e.g. Thampapillai et al., 2014; Van
der Ploeg, 2011). The costs of renewable energy production today still
exceed the costs of many fossil fuel technologies, making such invest-
ments economically unpopular (Labordena et al., 2017: 53). Switching
a country's energy dependency to renewables involves large sunk costs.
From this point of view, the above argument has an intuitive appeal:
large proceeds from non-renewable natural resources should make it
easier to overcome the challenge of sunk costs that are associated with
renewable energy transition.
However, while overall natural resource wealth can be conducive to
renewable energy transition, specific natural resources, such as petro-
leum, can be harmful due to their potentially corrosive effect on the
economy and governance. Since renewable energy production requires
innovation and involves economic diversification, it can be hampered
by three common interrelated effects of petroleum wealth: rent-cap-
turing by politicians, rent-seeking by vested interests, and lack of in-
centives for diversification (Ross, 2012; Bulte et al., 2005; Dunning,
2005). For these reasons, Europe can be seen as experiencing a carbon
lock-in, reliant on a fossil fuel intense economy due to long history of
fossil dependency (Bridle and Kitson, 2014; Lehmann et al., 2012).
First, when they are developed, fossil fuel industries, particularly
the petroleum sector, provide unusually high rents for incumbent
governments (Ross, 2012). In addition, they supply critical goods to the
economy, provide employment, and can be major actors in infra-
structure provision (Harvey and Pilgrim, 2014; Lehmann et al., 2012).
Thus, forgoing petroleum rents for uncertain prospects of developing
renewable energy production can be economically and politically costly
A.K. Ahmadov, C. van der Borg Energy Policy 126 (2019) 361–369
362
for incumbent political leaders.
Second, renewable energy transition is further complicated by the
fact that there are active vested interests in the fossil fuel industry
(Cadoret and Padovano, 2016; Marques et al., 2010; Strunz et al.,
2015). When it has substantial ‘market power’, fossil fuel industry plays
an important role in environmental policy. With such ‘market power’
the industry has sizeable financial, organizational, and political re-
sources to use as leverage in protecting its interests through active
lobbying (Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003).
Finally, largely resulting from the previous two factors but also
because of its unusually high rents (Ross, 2012), petroleum wealth can
act as an economic disincentive for innovation required for the devel-
opment and production of renewables. Countries that enjoy natural
resource wealth on average have strong incentives to avoid economic
diversification (Dunning, 2005). While other natural resources, such as
non-fuel minerals and timber, can be conducive for diversification,
petroleum abundance has been found to provide the strongest barrier
(Ahmadov, 2014).
We deduce two hypotheses from the above discussion:
Hypothesis 1. Higher total natural resource rents are likely to be
associated with higher levels of renewable energy production in EU
countries.
Hypothesis 2. Higher petroleum rents are likely to be associated with
lower levels of renewable energy production in EU countries.
4. Research design
To examine our hypotheses, we employ a mixed-methods research
design. We start with a multivariate panel data analysis to investigate
whether natural resource wealth and petroleum rents have significant
effects on renewable energy production in the EU. We follow up with a
two-N comparative qualitative case study.
4.1. Method 1. Quantitative analysis
4.1.1. Variables
Our statistical analysis covers 28 EU member states in the post-
Amsterdam treaty period between 1997 and 2015. While values for
some variables in the analysis are not available for all years, our dataset
is comprehensive and offers strongly balanced panel data on key vari-
ables (N= 509). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics.
Our dependent variable is RE Production measured as the ‘primary
production of renewable energy per capita in gigajoules’. Our in-
dependent variables are Total Resource Rents and Petroleum Rents. To
measure Total Resource Rents, we use the World Development Indicators
(WDI) ‘total natural resource rents as a percent of GDP’ variable to
construct a per capita measure. Ross (2008) shows that the per capita
measure avoids potentially serious biases that can stem from using GDP
as a denominator. Petroleum Rents is measured using the ‘oil and gas
rents per capita’ variable from Ross and Mahdavi (2015). This is con-
sidered the most accurate measure and has the advantage of extensive
geographic and temporal coverage (Ahmadov, 2011).1
Our baseline model includes control variables that reflect the five
alternative major explanations. First, to account for the potential effect
of economic development and economic growth, we use GDP per Capita
and GDP growth variables from the World Development Indicators
(WDI). Second, government fiscal stance on environmental issues is
measured through Environmental Taxes. These include all taxes whose
base is a physical unit with a demonstrated negative effect on the en-
vironment (Eurostat, 2017). Third, government political ideology is
measured through binary variables on ‘chief executive party orienta-
tion’ (CEP). Fourth, the Quality of Government is the average of the ICRG
variables ‘Corruption’, ‘Law and Order’ and ‘Bureaucracy Quality’, with
higher values indicating higher quality. Finally, we also control for CO2
Emissions and Energy Dependence.
We also modify the baseline model with the inclusion of other
variables. To check whether specific hypothesized aspects of govern-
ance have differential effects, we use the Corruption perceptions index
from Transparency International and Government Effectiveness and
Regulatory Quality variables from Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI). As a further check of the effect of government quality, we use a
“governance principal component” variable derived through Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) that reduces all six measures from
Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2011) to a few
dimensions.2 We use component one out of six that accounts for 85% of
variance.3 To further proxy for the government fiscal stance on the
environment, we constructed a variable RES-E policies that measures the
number of policies in a given year that promote renewable energy
sources for electricity (Jenner et al., 2013). Finally, we use a series of
dichotomous variables from the same source that indicate specific RES-
E policy choices, such as tendering schemes (reference category), cost
containment caps, feed-in tariffs (FIT), quota schemes, and tax in-
centives/investment grants.4
4.1.2. Estimation and model specification
Our choice of the estimation method and model specification de-
pend on several considerations. First, Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian
multiplier test for random effects renders evidence of significant dif-
ferences across countries, suggesting that an OLS regression is in-
appropriate. Next, we check whether fixed or random effects model
should be used. The Hausman test where the null hypothesis is that the
preferred model is random-effects yields a statistically significant result,
suggesting that country fixed effects should be used.5 Country fixed-
effects model is also appropriate because we are interested in the effect
of explanatory factors that vary in time.6
Since the Wald test indicated that there is heteroskedasticity in the
data, we estimated all models using robust standard errors. From the
1We do not find evidence for a multicollinearity concern between Total
Resource Rents and Petroleum Wealth, since their Variance Inflation Factors (VIF)
in the baseline model are 2.4 and 1.6, respectively (reported in Supplementary
material for space concerns). We thank Referee 1 for bringing our attention to
this. In addition, since in subsequent analysis the standard errors of in-
dependent variables’ coefficients are of moderate size in relation to the sizes of
the coefficients, we conclude that the partial effects are estimated with rea-
sonable precision and it is not difficult to unravel the effects of different pre-
dictors (Wooldridge, 2012).
2 We thank Referee 4 for this useful suggestion.
3 See Supplementary material, Figure 1 for the screeplot of eigenvalues after
Principal Component Analysis.
4 We thank Referee 4 for this useful suggestion. We also tried to include
variables on average government expenditure on these schemes and average
wholesale electricity prices, but, apart from Platts proprietary data to which we
do not have access, other data are incomplete and inconsistent for the period
under analysis in this paper. For example, Eurostat data does not cover most of
the countries as its pre-2007 data is available only for 11 EU members and is
inconsistent over time as it has a break in measurement in 2007, and other data
that are scattered across various EU reports (e.g., European Commission market
analysis reports) is reported in different formats and inconsistently for different
countries. In addition, while in principle it could also be useful to further dis-
tinguish between fixed FIT and feed-in premiums, in the period under analysis
in our dataset only Denmark had the latter, thus entailing too small a sub-
sample.
5 The results from random-effects model are not substantively different from
the results obtained from fixed-effects.
6 Technically, time-fixed effects may be useful but from a substantive point of
view their inclusion is doubtful because, given a strong general time trend in
the push for renewable energy transition, this inclusion absorbs the effects of
time-varying variables that are of much higher interest for comparative re-
search.
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Wooldridge test we concluded that there is autocorrelation in the data.
Since our dataset is not a macro panel (> 20–30 years) and has smaller
T relative to N, autocorrelation is a minor issue (Wooldridge, 2010).
However, since it can yield smaller standard errors and larger R-
squared values than warranted, we address it by clustering the robust
standard errors by country. To reflect the appropriate time delay in the
potential effect of independent variables on the dependent variable, we
follow the literature and use 2-year time lags for rent variables, eco-
nomic development, growth, and environmental taxes, and 3-year lags
for the variables that reflect government ideology, quality of govern-
ment, CO2 emissions, and energy dependence (we vary these lags in












RE Production β Total Resource Rents β Petroleum Rents
β GDP per Capita β GDP Growth
β Environmental Taxes β Ideology
β Quality of Government









1 2 2 2
3 2 4 2
5 2 6 3
7 3
8 3 9 3
4.2. Method 2. A qualitative case study
In the small-N study, we focus on the cases of two countries that
have many similarities but differ in the amount of natural resource
wealth. The objective here is to unravel the potential impact of natural
resource wealth, or lack thereof, on these country's political economy
and incentives for diversification, and how these may have affected
renewable energy production in each case. Here we draw on evidence
from the analysis of policy documents, mass media, and secondary
sources.
Such small-N comparative qualitative analysis complements the
large-N econometric analysis by enabling an in-depth exploration of the
underlying mechanisms in the relationship between natural resource
wealth and renewable energy production. By illustrating, through the
use of detailed historical evidence, the workings of actors and processes
that link our variables of interest, the case study puts the findings of the
regression analysis in political-economic and policy context of specific
countries and thus provides additional explanatory leverage. Finally, by
offering more fine-grained evidence on key variables, it allows to fill
potential gaps that may be left by the econometric analysis’ inevitable
reliance on cross-country measures that enable parsimony and
strengthen external validity but may not capture all dimensions of
important factors.8
We focus on the cases of the Netherlands and Belgium in the period
before and after their ratification of 2020 Energy Strategy in 2009. The
two countries share many political, economic, cultural, and geographic
similarities. They have similar political systems (parliamentary system
and constitutional monarchy), similar levels of economic development,
standards of living, population sizes, geographic area, and are both
relatively flat and densely populated (IEA, 2016). Yet, they differ
considerably in natural resource wealth. The Netherlands has been
classified as a top 10 natural gas-producer since it discovered natural
gas fields in the 1960s (Aardgas in Nederland, 2017). These discoveries
have meant large petroleum rents. Belgium, on the other hand, is re-
source poor and has no petroleum wealth. Although once coal was the
main indigenous source of energy, since early 1990s the supplies have
been mostly exhausted or economically unattractive to extract, and the
domestic production stopped after the closure of the last mine in 1992
(IEA, 2016). Another difference between the two countries is the fact
that Belgium is a federal state and therefore historically divided be-
tween the Dutch speaking part, the Flemish region, and the French
speaking part, the Walloon region. This factor, however, should be a
disadvantage to Belgium as it may lead to an inconsistent policy with
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Measurement N Mean SD Min Max Source
Dependent
RE Production Per capita primary production of renewable energies
in gigajoules, logged
509 2.46 1 0 4.84 Constructed from Eurostat (2017) (energy) and
World Bank (2017) (population)
Independent
Total Resource Rents Per capita total natural resource rents in constant
2011 USD, logged
509 8.91 1.81 3.22 13.54 Constructed from World Bank (2017)
Petroleum Rents Per capita oil and gas rents in constant 2014 USD,
logged
509 2.78 2.63 0 10.25 Ross and Mahdavy (2015)
Control
GDP per Capita GDP per capita, PPP, in constant 2011 USD, logged 509 10.3 0.45 9.05 11.49 World Bank (2017)
GDP Growth GDP growth, annual % 509 2.4 3.52 − 14.81 11.89 World Bank (2017)
Environmental Taxes Per capita environmental tax revenues in constant
2015 euro, logged
509 6.08 0.9 2.69 7.62 Constructed from Eurostat (2017) (taxes) and
World Bank (2017) (population)
Ideology: Center 1=Chief executive party orientation is center 509 0.13 0.33 0 1 Beck et al. (2001)
Ideology: Left 1=Chief executive party orientation is left 509 0.35 0.48 0 1 Beck et al. (2001)
Quality of Government ICRG indicator of quality of government 509 0.76 0.16 0.39 1 PRS (2016)
CO2 Emissions CO2 emissions in metric tons per capita 509 8.10 3.46 2.68 24.82 World Bank (2017)
Energy Dependence Net imports/sum of gross inland energy consumption
plus bunkers
491 54.0 29.28 − 49.80 109.50 Eurostat (2017)
Corruption Corruption perceptions index 494 64.2 19.32 26 100 Transparency International (2016)
Government Effectiveness Government effectiveness index 429 1.19 0.64 − 0.62 2.36 Kaufmann et al. (2011)
Regulatory Quality Regulatory quality index 429 1.21 0.43 − 0.12 2.08 Kaufmann et al. (2011)
Governance PC Principal component 1 from Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) of six WGI measures
429 0.05 2.23 − 5.74 3.86 Constructed based on Kaufmann et al. (2011)
RES-E Policies Number of policies enacted for promoting renewable
energy sources for electricity
478 1.86 1.15 0 4 Constructed based on Jenner et al. (2013) data
Notes: Some variables are log-transformed to avoid skew (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). ‘Ideology: Right’ is a reference category for ideology.
7 Substantively, given the structural nature of our key independent variables
(Ross, 2012; Bulte et al., 2005; Dunning, 2005), we do not see concerns for
reverse causality between our variables of interest and thus little value in
complementing the fixed-effects panel data analysis with instrumental-vari-
ables techniques.
8 We are grateful to Referee 1 for suggesting to highlight the value added by
the case study.
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regards to renewables throughout the country.
5. Quantitative analysis results and discussion
To summarize, the results in Table 2 confirm the expectations of this
paper. In line with our hypotheses, while natural resource rents are
associated with an increase in renewable energy production, petroleum
rents are consistently associated with a decrease. Both relationships are
statistically significant at least at 0.05 level, controlling for other factors
suggested in the literature.
To interpret the results in Model 1 in terms of partial elasticities: if
total natural resource rents per capita increase by 10%, we would ex-
pect renewable energy production in gigajoules per capita to increase
by about 0.9%, holding other independent variables constant.
Conversely, if petroleum rents per capita increase by 10%, we would
expect the production of renewable energy gigajoules per capita to
decrease by 1.1%, holding all other predictors constant.
These results remain largely the same when we modify the baseline
model to use different aspects of governance (Models 2–4) or a “gov-
ernance principal component” (Model 5), include RES-E policies (Model
6), restrict observations to years since a country became an official
member of the EU9 (Model 7) and to the period after the adoption of the
2020 Energy Strategy to see whether the latter has affected the re-
lationships of interest (Model 8). All models provide a good fit. The
values of pseudo-R squares (within) for Models 1–7 suggest that the
models account for about 60% and for Model 8 for about 40% of the
variance within the panel units.
Table 2
Predictors of renewable energy production in the EU, 1997–2015.
Dependent variable: RE Production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Resource Rentst−2 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.065** 0.088*** 0.062** 0.066** 0.086*** 0.095**
(0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.035) (0.030) (0.039)
Petroleum Rentst−2 − 0.113*** − 0.099*** − 0.093*** − 0.102*** − 0.099*** − 0.078** − 0.096** − 0.123***
(0.037) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.034) (0.044) (0.041)
GDP per Capitat−2 0.640** 0.607*** 0.841*** 0.696*** 0.946*** 0.530** 0.736** 0.486
(0.258) (0.194) (0.265) (0.223) (0.255) (0.234) (0.336) (0.428)
GDP Growtht−2 − 0.011*** − 0.011*** − 0.007*** − 0.009*** − 0.008*** − 0.007** − 0.009*** − 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Environmental Taxest−2 0.334*** 0.370*** 0.338*** 0.368*** 0.295*** 0.295*** 0.491*** 0.335**
(0.093) (0.091) (0.101) (0.086) (0.091) (0.092) (0.098) (0.153)
Ideology: Centert−3 − 0.122** − 0.132** − 0.078 − 0.111* − 0.081* − 0.113** − 0.138** − 0.007
(0.052) (0.060) (0.052) (0.055) (0.042) (0.047) (0.050) (0.039)
Ideology: Leftt−3 − 0.014 − 0.013 − 0.022 − 0.024 − 0.018 − 0.027 − 0.012 − 0.025
(0.033) (0.035) (0.031) (0.029) (0.026) (0.035) (0.038) (0.021)
Quality of Governmentt−3 − 0.391 − 0.370 − 0.179 0.492
(0.559) (0.588) (0.617) (0.879)
CO2 Emissionst−3 − 0.082 − 0.083 − 0.075** − 0.081* − 0.071* − 0.071 − 0.087* − 0.093***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.034) (0.042) (0.036) (0.048) (0.051) (0.019)
Energy Dependencet−3 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 − 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Corruptiont−3 − 0.002
(0.006)
Government Effectivenesst−3 − 0.393***
(0.132)
Regulatory Qualityt−3 − 0.146
(0.120)
Governance PCt−3 − 0.162***
(0.041)
Number of RES-E Policiest−3 − 0.179***
(0.048)








Constant − 5.821** − 5.945*** − 7.477*** − 6.658*** − 8.772*** − 4.475** − 7.939** − 4.456
(2.330) (1.500) (1.974) (1.675) (1.954) (2.001) (3.283) (3.917)
Observations 436 423 362 362 362 424 381 196
Countries 28 28 28 28 28 27 28 28
‘Within R-squared’ 0.621 0.615 0.645 0.599 0.650 0.657 0.590 0.401
F 18.50*** 19.07*** 28.73*** 23.49*** 35.30*** 25.42*** 21.50*** 10.05***
Note: All models use country fixed effects, employing within-regression estimator. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by country. ‘Ideology: right’ is a
reference category for ideological binaries. Model 6 excludes Croatia since data on RES-E policies is not available for it. Model 6 uses “Tendering Scheme” (Jenner
et al., 2013) as a reference category for RES-E policies. Model 7 restricts observations to years since a country became official member of the EU. Model 8 restricts
observations to the period after the adoption of the 2020 Energy Strategy.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
9 The rationale for including years when the country had not yet become an
EU member is that it was likely to be pushed to move towards renewable energy
in the pre-accession period (Knill and Tosun, 2009).
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Our main results regarding the effects of natural resource rents
survive multiple robustness checks (Supplementary material, Table 3),
such as accounting for potential effect of R&D expenditure per capita;
regionalist producer interests that can hinder environmental pro-
grammes (Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003); dropping energy de-
pendence and environmental taxes variables, and increased or shor-
tened time lags.
Three other patterns arise from our models. First, somewhat sur-
prisingly, the results indicate that, while an overall higher level of
economic development is indeed conducive for renewable energy pro-
duction, higher growth may hamper it, possibly because it advantages
existing sources of energy by requiring a larger supply of energy than
can be currently delivered by renewable energy projects.
Second, policy variables seem to matter consistently more than
governance variable and temporal changes in environmental pressures.
While ideology makes a difference in that centrist chief executive par-
ties (CEPs) may be less conducive to renewable energy production than
right CEPs, having a left-oriented CEP does not have a statistically
significant different effect on renewable energy production than having
a right CEP. Once other factors are taken into account, surprisingly, the
quality of government does not seem to exert a consistent, positive,
statistically significant effect as expected based on previous knowledge,
and in two models governance quality and government effectiveness
have negative signs. While this might be suggesting a lack of true effect,
it may also indicate that prominent cross-national measures of gov-
ernment quality are rather general to sense energy-specific areas where
governance quality may indeed matter for renewable energy produc-
tion. Furthermore, contrary to some arguments, temporal changes in
environmental pressures, such as CO2 emissions and energy depen-
dence, do not have a consistent, statistically significant effect when
other factors are accounted for. On the other hand, there is strong
evidence to support the hypothesis on the importance of actual fiscal
policy commitment and of policy choices on renewables. Contrary to
some previous findings, environmental taxes have a consistent, posi-
tive, statistically and substantively significant effect on renewable en-
ergy production.
Finally, policy design choices on renewables matter, confirming
some previous findings (Jenner et al., 2013), but merely increasing the
number of policies may prove detrimental. Compared to tendering
schemes, feed-in tariffs seem to have highest impact on renewable en-
ergy production, followed by cost-containment caps, quota schemes,
and tax incentives/investment grants. Investing in R&D may also boost
renewable energy production (Supplementary material, Table 4).
6. A case study: renewable energy transition in the Netherlands
and Belgium
Before 2009, when both the Netherlands and Belgium ratified the
2020 Energy Strategy, they had different levels of renewable energy
production (Fig. 1, Panel A). While Belgium initially lagged behind, by
2009 it caught up with the Netherlands. In terms of the share of re-
newable energy in gross final energy consumption (Fig. 1, Panel B), the
two countries entered the 2020 Energy Strategy with similar levels. The
differences in initial capacities corresponded to different 2020 targets:
the Netherlands had to reach a share of 14% of renewable energy in
final consumption by 2020, this was 13% for Belgium. The Dutch target
was seen as very modest compared to others, partly because of the
country resource endowments (Oteman et al., 2014).
Due to the similar geographic properties, both countries have pur-
sued similar options for renewable energies. In the Netherlands, the
renewable energy mix in 2009 consisted largely of biofuels and waste,
followed by wind energy (IEA, 2014: 106). Over time, this mix has not
diversified. While energy from biofuels and wind has grown marginally,
other alternative forms of renewable energy, such as geothermal en-
ergy, have actually decreased in use (ibid.). Similarly, Belgium also
entered the 2020 Energy Strategy with a renewable energy mix that was
predominantly characterized by biofuels and waste (IEA, 2016: 117).
Yet, over time, renewable energy production has diversified as the
amount of solar energy increased (IEA, 2016).
The two countries have made different progress towards achieving
their goals. In terms of renewable energy production, over the course of
five years the Netherlands increased its productive capacity per capita
by 3.98 GJ, while Belgium improved its capacity by 4.23 GJ. Thus,
Belgium increased its capacity by 0.25 GJ per capita more than the
Netherlands. This difference may seem small because it is expressed in
per capita units but it is sizeable cross-nationally. In 2015, 65% of
Belgium's total energy production came from nuclear energy, but its
renewable energy accounted for 28.5% of the total production
(Table 3). In the same year, petroleum accounted for 86.3% of the
Netherlands’ energy production, while its renewable energy was around
10%.
If we use the consumption-based measure used by the EU, the
contrasting progress of the Netherlands and Belgium towards their re-
newable energy goals is even starker (Fig. 1). While the Netherlands
increased its renewable energy share in final energy consumption by
1.26% over the five-year period, Belgium increased its share by 3.80%.
This meant that in 2014, Belgium was 3.96% away from meeting their
2020 obligation, while the Netherlands needs to increase its share by
8.33% if it wants to reach its target.
Thus, despite their similarities, the Netherlands and Belgium exhibit
noticeable variation in terms of renewable energy deployment both in
terms of production and consumption. Below we explore how varying
levels of natural resource wealth can help explain these differences.
6.1. Rent-capturing? Natural resource rents and government revenues
The Netherlands relies significantly on the natural resource sector as
a source of income for its national budget. Between 2009 and 2014,
Fig. 1. Renewable energy in the Netherlands and Belgium.
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revenues from the natural gas production comprised on average be-
tween 5% and 10% of total government revenues (Aardgas in
Nederland, 2017). More than 50% of the revenues generated from
natural gas comes from sources other than tax revenue (Aardgas in
Nederland, 2017). This is due to the fact that the Dutch government set
up the EBN, a public company, which acts on behalf of the government
in investing, exploring, and extracting natural gas in the Netherlands
since 1973 (EBN, 2017).
Belgium, on the other hand, does not have such a source of gov-
ernment revenue. Yet, government revenue, measured in percentages of
GDP, was actually higher in Belgium throughout the period under in-
vestigation compared to the Netherlands. While on average the Belgian
government revenue comprised around 50% of the country's GDP, the
Dutch government revenue comprised around 43% (OECD, 2017).
Belgium earned this revenue mainly through taxation. Unsurprisingly,
Belgium has one of the highest tax rates in the European Union, par-
ticularly in terms of taxes on electricity, while these are comparably low
in the Netherlands (Deloitte, 2013).
A large share of government revenue comprised of natural resource
rents is, of course, by itself not necessarily problematic. The resource
curse literature emphasizes that resource wealth become a ‘curse’ only
if pre-existing institutions are characterized by a lack of accountability,
and can be a blessing in a democratic system with strong checks and
balances (Mehlum et al., 2006). Precisely because the Netherlands is
considered a country with strong democratic institutions, natural re-
source revenues should provide it with a comparative advantage over
Belgium in terms of the renewable energy sector development, as it has
more capital to develop it. Yet, that would entail that resource revenues
would proceed to the development of these sectors (Riley, 1980).
However, available evidence points at some manifestations of eco-
nomic mismanagement of natural resources in the Netherlands. Early
problems with abundant resource rents and an over-reliance on these
rents for the development of the public sector led the country to suffer
from the ‘Dutch Disease’ after the discovery of large gas reserves in the
1950's, as government spending became unsustainable and crowded out
traditional economic sectors (Banning, 2009). This problem was over-
come, but some negative effects of resource wealth appear to have
continued. First, how the successive governments have spent resource
rents is not transparent and sometimes untraceable (Algemene
Rekenkamer, 2014). Second, income from natural resources has fre-
quently financed consumption, including the Dutch welfare state, ra-
ther than invested, indicating a widespread problem in natural re-
source-rich countries when proceeds from resource wealth extraction
are treated as income rather than assets (Banning, 2009; Humphreys
et al., 2007; Jackson and Evrengün, 2006).
These trends continued despite the establishment in 1995 of the
‘Fund for Strengthening Economic Structures’ (FES), to which some part
of the gas revenues was allocated (Hers and Suyker, 2014). The primary
goal of this fund was to invest revenues in infrastructure as well as for
research into the environment (Jackson and Evrengün, 2006). How-
ever, in 2005 the fund's mandate was expanded to include spending on
the development of the knowledge economy in what came to be called
as investment into ‘environment, education, innovation’ (Hers and
Suyker, 2014). This reformulation considerably expanded the room for
interpretation, allowing policymakers to channel funds to finance
sizeable projects of dubious worth. For instance, in 2006, only 14
projects out of 49 were evaluated to be beneficial to Dutch welfare; in
2008, out of 23 projects, only 6 were considered worthwhile (Banning,
2009; CBP, 2008). The changing of the rules of the FES to an alternative
that suits the needs of incumbent political leaders is a recognized pitfall
of natural resource funds across the world (Humphreys and Sandbu,
2007).
Not having such a fund that could have been tapped into as a source
of income, Belgium has avoided some of the problems experienced by
the Netherlands. Since Belgium lacks its own resources, it has become
dependent on imported energy (Deloitte, 2013: 2). This has, on several
occasions, threatened the country's energy security, which led to the
establishment of a public stockholding company (APERTA) to manage
oil shocks (Deloitte, 2013). Belgium has been also heavily reliant on
nuclear energy, which produced 55% of Belgium's electricity in 2013
(Deloitte, 2013). However, the public backlash that has been spreading
regarding nuclear energy has increasingly challenged Belgium's energy
security even further, as it is planning to ‘phase-out’ nuclear energy
between 2015 and 2025 (Deloitte, 2013).
6.2. Rent-seeking? Influence of vested interests
In addition, in the Netherlands fossil-fuel corporations have had
strong influence on government policy, particularly those involved in
the petroleum sector. Royal Dutch Shell, Gasunie (Dutch natural gas
infrastructure and transportation company), and Exxon have strong
lobbies (Oteman et al., 2014; Ulmanen et al., 2009). The petroleum
sector also has indirect lobbying influence because agriculture and
transport sectors are heavily subsidized for using fossil fuels and,
therefore, have also been engaged in lobbying for fossil fuels (Oteman
et al., 2014). This influence has resulted in the creation and sustenance
of more than 50 government interventions that favour the usage of
fossil fuels among businesses and households (Oteman et al., 2014). In
comparison to the influence of these vested interests, the political in-
fluence of the lobby for renewable energy has been very limited as it
lacks similar economic leverage. For example, unlike Germany with its
large industry for solar panels and Denmark with its turbine manu-
facturing, the Netherlands does not have a sizeable industry for
building renewable facilities (Oteman et al., 2014).
Despite relying on gas imports primarily from the Netherlands and
Norway and having an oil refinery sector (Chellingsworth et al., 2016),
the near-absence of domestic production has limited the influence of
fossil fuel producers in Belgium compared to the Netherlands. Com-
petences on energy matters are divided between the federal state and
the three regions, resulting in four energy regulators (Chellingsworth
et al., 2016). While this has complicated decision-making on energy
policy, it has also allowed multiple entry points for smaller and varied
interest groups. While the neo-corporatist system in Belgium has tra-
ditionally led to centralized access and limited the number of mobilized
interest groups, some features of its political system such as multi-
layeredness allow the entrance of various interest groups (Fraussen and
Beyers, 2016). Such system also allows interest groups to target several
levels (Destrooper, 2017).
6.3. (Limited) diversification towards renewable energy
In general, evidence points at a lack of commitment towards the
renewable energy sector in the Netherlands compared to Belgium, al-
though this has varied over time. For example, while some coalitions in
the Dutch government were keen on pursuing renewable energy op-
tions, others have been less inclined. The 2005 government under the
mandate of the CDA (Christian Democratic Alliance), Labour and the
Christian Union set a national target of 20% of renewable energy for
2020, the elected government in 2009, with the VVD (People's Party for
Freedom and Democracy) and CDA in power, abandoned this target
(Statistics Netherlands, 2010).
Table 3
Energy production in the Netherlands and Belgium, 2015.
Source: Eurostat (2017).
Share of total production, 2015 (%)
Nuclear
energy
Solid fuels Natural gas Crude oil Renewable
energy
Belgium 65.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.5
Netherlands 2.2 0.0 82.0 4.3 10.1
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Furthermore, while the Netherlands used to have a subsidy scheme
(the MEP schemes) for the production of renewable energy, which
helped the country in achieving 9% electricity production from re-
newables by 2009 by providing large amounts of fiscal incentives, this
scheme was abandoned in 2006 even though it was a success (Statistics
Netherlands, 2010: 20). Although the Dutch government reasoned that
this prevented a huge budget overspill as the target for which the
subsidy scheme had been set was achieved, the new subsidy scheme
(the SDE), which put a limit to the subsidy available, was only in-
troduced in 2008, leaving a two-year gap of uncertainty (ibid.).
In 2011, this new subsidy scheme was promptly replaced by the
SDE+ (Stimulering Duurzame Energieproductie), which left the pro-
duction of renewable energy more over to the market by providing
fiscal support through a feed-in support scheme (OECD, 2014: 111).
While this scheme is supposed to equalize the price of renewables to
fossil fuels, recent reports have shown that the subsidy scheme has had
little effect on the production of renewables as it is simply too low
(Algemene Rekenkamer, 2015).
These different decisions have had serious consequences for the
renewable energy sector. Namely, the many changes to the subsidy
schemes have increased uncertainty of investors as they have had little
reassurance about ‘financial preconditions’ (Statistics Netherlands,
2010: 23). The problem the Netherlands is facing is clearly that a long-
term policy would mean strong commitment to renewable energy
production. In the face of sufficient non-renewable resources, politi-
cians in the Netherlands are fairly unwilling to make this commitment
(Statistics Netherlands, 2010, 28).
Belgium on the other hand, has not had similar difficulties in re-
newable energy policies. Unlike the Netherlands, the Belgian govern-
ment has shown stronger commitment to creating incentives for in-
vestments through subsidies (IEA, 2016). For example, in 2013, support
costs for renewable electricity ‘ranged from EUR 24.11 per MWh for
hydropower to EUR 369.07 per MWh for solar PV’ (IEA, 2016, p. 123).
This meant that the Belgian government provided the fourth-highest
level of support to renewables in Europe, after the Czech Republic,
Italy, and Greece (IEA, 2016, p. 123).
While Belgium, like the Netherlands, is also suffering from a lack of
confidence from renewable energy investors, this is due to a different
reason: while the Dutch problem comes from a lack of consistent gov-
ernmental support, the Belgian problem is due to too much government
support. This has led to excess demand and a struggle of the Belgian
authorities to get the support scheme just right (IEA, 2016: 126).
Consequently, unlike the Netherlands, another problem Belgium faces
is not that its politicians are not willing to invest in renewables, but
rather, that they are willing to invest too much.
7. Conclusion and policy implications
This paper offers the first systematic empirical investigation of the
effect of natural resource wealth on renewable energy production
across the EU since 1997. Its theoretical framework reconciles di-
vergent views on the role of natural resources. Using a mixed-methods
research design that combined panel data analysis with an in-depth
comparative case study, the paper shows that while overall natural
resource abundance may be conducive, petroleum wealth negatively
affects renewable energy production in the EU. Through employing new
and better measures and a small-N study that allows exploring pro-
cesses at closer range, this contribution arrives at findings that confirm
suspicions of several previous studies (e.g., Marques et al., 2010). These
findings echo the resource curse literature (Ross, 2012; Bulte et al.,
2005; Dunning, 2005) and suggest that, even in the presence of strong
democratic institutions, countries with petroleum wealth can find it
difficult to avoid potential pitfalls of this wealth. However, in demo-
cratic institutional environments characterized with strong account-
ability, the distortions triggered by such wealth are amenable to policy
interventions (Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006). Our findings
show the continuing relevance of the argument that to achieve the
ambitious goals on renewable energy deployment, the EU indeed needs
additional and stricter policies (Harmelink et al., 2006).
These findings contribute to the debates on European energy policy
by suggesting a number of implications for the EU and national policies.
First, the EU and member states can generally harness rents from nat-
ural resource wealth to provide a required capital to address the chal-
lenge of sunk costs for renewable energy production, such as through
financing facilities for renewables. Yet they should also undertake
stronger fiscal and regulatory interventions to explicitly tackle con-
tinued pernicious effects of specific natural resources, such as petro-
leum, including rent-capturing by politicians, rent-seeking by vested
interests, and lack of incentives to diversify. Given our findings, one
potential measure is developing a strict roadmap for phasing out fossil-
fuel subsidies in production and consumption, such as curtailing in-
vestment in fossil fuel infrastructure, preferential tax treatment, or
royalty exemptions. On national level, these can be envisaged through,
for example, national budgets’ direct payment systems, fiscal (dis)in-
centives, and national development banks. On the EU level, this can be
contemplated through, for example, the EU budget and European Fund
for Strategic Investments (EFSI).
Other measures can include tightening the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme to reduce manipulation and loophole exploitation by vested
interests (Strunz et al., 2015) and lending stronger and higher-level
support to renewable energy advocacy coalitions so as to reduce the
unevenness of the political playing field (Lehmann et al., 2012). In
combination with bolstering R&D spending, such support can also fa-
cilitate learning and knowledge spill-overs (Lehmann et al., 2012). As
our case study suggests, the timing of policies is important, and pro-
renewable energy groups should capitalize on the momentum presented
by such events as increasingly serious earthquakes in Groningen in the
Netherlands that are due to its continued production of gas.
Second, our findings suggest that actual fiscal policy commitment,
such as levying higher environmental taxes and policy design (e.g., the
choice between feed-in tariffs, quota schemes, and tendering), have
substantially higher impact for supporting renewable energy produc-
tion than government ideology, quality of governance or temporal
changes in environmental pressures. Furthermore, increasing the
number of policies to support renewable energy projects without at-
tention to policy design may actually be counterproductive. Finally, for
the intended positive effect to occur, policies affecting renewable en-
ergy production directly or indirectly should be made not only trans-
parent, but also consistent and stable. The case of the Netherlands
suggests how such inconsistency and instability can be linked to pet-
roleum revenues. Thus, we re-iterate with new evidence the importance
of reducing such inconsistency (White et al., 2013). Given increasing
cross-national policy learning and spill-overs related to petroleum
production, it is imperative to embed national RES policies in an in-
tegrated EU-wide system with comprehensive energy scenarios and
partially harmonized rules (Lehmann et al., 2012).
Naturally, our study has limitations. First, while the measures of
natural resource wealth are the best currently available, for the pur-
poses of our analysis ideally they would be supplemented by measures
of the state's fiscal reliance on such resources. The problem, however, is
that such measures currently do not exist, although progress is being
made.10 Second, while our research design aims to minimize omitted
variable concerns by adopting purportedly exogenous factors, by con-
trolling for confounders advanced in the literature, and by exploring
causal processes through an in-depth comparative qualitative study,
such concerns cannot be ruled out. Finally, we aimed at rigour in the
small-N study by selecting cases that are very similar, but the fact re-
mains that no two countries can ever be the same and that the results
10 The work of Haber and Menaldo (2011) and ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2016) is
thus promising.
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from such analysis may not travel far beyond the original cases.
From this study, there are also two particularly important ways to
go forward for further research. First, the mechanisms explaining the
relationships between resource wealth and renewable energy produc-
tion should be further investigated. This study's inclusion of qualitative
analysis acted as an additional insight into the relationship observed by
quantitative analysis. However, future research should focus on com-
paring more cases, and perhaps focusing more on micro-level decision-
making, carefully investigating the choices made by relevant actors and
the effect of these choices on policy making. Second, work should be
done towards the development of accurate measures that capture a
state's fiscal reliance on the non-renewable energy sector.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the
online version at doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2018.11.044.
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